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1. Introduction
Numerous studies have documented that announcements of changes in dividends convey
specific information to the market (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980;
among others). The majority of these studies are conducted using U.S. data. One natural question
is whether these dividend effects are peculiar to the U.S. or if they are also prominent in
countries where the tax regime and/or institutional and economic characteristics are significantly
different.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate stock price reactions to announcements of cash
dividends by companies listed in the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) to identify whether or not
such dividends contain information relevant to price formation1.
Several important economic and institutional features make Oman a unique and
interesting environment in which to examine the market reaction to cash dividend
announcements.
First, Oman has a unique tax system that allows us to examine the tax-based signaling
hypothesis related to Black’s (1976) dividend puzzle. He raises the question of why companies
pay dividends, despite the fact that dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains. Taxbased signaling models provide an answer to this question. The higher tax on dividends relative
1

Firms listed in the MSM distribute dividends in two forms, cash dividends and stock dividends, though we

consider only cash dividends in the empirical tests in this paper. The normal practice for these firms is to announce
earnings ahead of dividends. Dividend distributions in one form or another are not compulsory. If a company’s
board of directors proposes to distribute dividends, the details must be published in the daily newspapers. The
proposed dividend is subject to the final approval at the shareholders’ Annual General Meeting (AGM). Generally,
most dividend propositions are accepted at the AGM because the board of directors usually represents the majority
of the share capital. Firms usually distribute dividends only once a year.
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to capital gains makes dividends informative about the company’s future prospects and cash flow
(Bhattcharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985). These models argue that dividends would not be
informative if not for the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains (Amihud and Murgia,
1997). In Oman, there are no taxes on dividends and capital gains2. This situation provides us
with a unique opportunity to test the tax-based dividend signaling model. Under arrangements
such as Oman’s, existing models predict that dividends will not be informative, or at least will
have less information. If we find that stock prices react to cash dividend announcements, then
this suggests that the higher taxation on dividends relative to capital gains is not a necessary
condition for dividends to convey information. This finding would also suggest that there are
other factors beyond taxation differentials that make dividends informative.
Second, Omani companies rely heavily on bank financing (Al-Yahyaee, 2006). If bank
monitoring is effective, then dividend payments may not be necessary to reduce the tendency of
managers to overinvest free cash flow. This should reduce the announcement effects of dividends
on stock prices. Moreover, Omani companies are owned by a small number of investors who
have controlling interests (Al-Yahyaee, 2006)3. This concentrated ownership structure should
reduce the agency cost between managers and shareholders. If the concentration of ownership
leads to less information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, dividend
2

As Oman is a petroleum-producing country, taxes play a minor role in generating income for the economy (Al-

Yahyaee et al., 2008). As a result, shareholders are not subject to any taxes on dividends. Likewise, there are no
taxes on capital gains. The only taxes are the 12% flat tax rate on corporate income. This makes the tax system in
Oman one of the simplest in the world.
3

During the sample period for this study (January 1997 to December 2005) the average ownership of MSM-listed

firms by shareholders who own at least ten percent of the issued capital is 52 percent. See Al-Yahyaee (2006) for
more details, or contact the corresponding author.
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announcements should have smaller pricing effects compared to countries where companies are
owned by diverse groups of investors. Both arguments, together with the absence of taxes on
dividends and capital gains, suggest that dividends act as neither information-signals nor
disciplinary mechanisms, and overall, these attributes suggest a diminished role for dividends in
Oman.
Third, transparency in Oman is low, while corporate disclosure requirements are loose
(Islam, 2003). There is a scarcity of professional financial analysts, and management forecasts
are not provided. Furthermore, Oman lacks credible media to disseminate financial information,
which in most developed countries is provided by a specialized part of the press and the
electronic media. Investors have few other sources of information on Omani companies, and this
makes cash dividend announcements an important source of information in pricing Omani
shares. The above analysis implies that dividends can be used to evaluate management
expectations and confidence as to the future performance and prospects of the firm.
Furthermore, a feature of Omani MSM-listed firms is their variability in cash dividend
payments. The majority of Omani firms change their dividends almost every year (see Table 1
below). This practice contrasts with patterns observed in the U.S. and other developed countries,
where most stocks experience relatively few changes in their dividends. In fact, Aharony and
Swary (1980) find that about 87% of sampled firms had no change in quarterly dividend
payments in the U.S during the period January 1963 to December 1976. In the data sampled by
Bajaj and Vijh (1990), more than 80% of announcements made between July 1962 and June
1987 involve no change in dividends. When a dividend increase is made, the evidence suggests
that managers are reluctant to return to previous levels of dividends because announcements of

4

dividend decreases result in significant share price declines. Variability in cash dividends has
been shown to diminish the information content of dividends (Chen et al., 2002).
Whether or not investors use cash dividend announcements to price shares in Oman is an
empirical question. While studies in developed markets show that cash dividend announcements
have information content, the picture is less clear in Oman. On the one hand, the absence of
taxes, high bank leverage, and share ownership concentration, the lack of professional analysts,
and individual investors’ relatively limited knowledge of accounting and finance all suggest that
dividend announcements may have little impact on share prices. On the other hand, investors
have few other sources of information on companies and so, in a relative sense, dividend
announcements may still be the most important piece of information with which investors value
stocks. We investigate whether the net effect of these factors is positive or negative..
Just as in the U.S., our evidence shows that the market reacts strongly to announcements
of changes in cash dividends. This finding shows that such announcements are used by investors
as information signals. Firms that increase their dividends experience an increase in stock prices,
while those that decrease their dividends see an opposite effect. Firms that have no change in
their dividends experience insignificant negative average abnormal returns, a pattern that is
consistent with the view that no change in dividends is, on average, a disappointment. These
findings support the view that dividends convey unique and valuable information to investors.
Furthermore, these results stand in sharp contrast to tax-based signaling models that argue that
tax differences are a necessary condition for dividends to convey information about a firm’s
future prospects and cash flows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the pertinent
theories and empirical literature for this study. Section 3 describes both the data sources used in
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this paper and the specifics of our data sample. Section 4 describes the methodology employed in
the paper, and section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical and empirical studies
In the U.S. it is well established that the market reacts to dividend announcements, which
implies that dividends contain information (Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980). Capital
markets react favorably to “good news” announcements (dividend increases) and adversely to
“bad news” announcements (dividend decreases). The implication is that dividend increases
represent positive information about the company’s prospects. Conversely, a dividend decrease
is a negative signal about the company’s future prospects. The most frequently cited explanation
for this pattern is that dividends contain information: the signaling hypothesis. This hypothesis
states that the firm uses dividends as signaling devices to convey valuable information to the
market.
2.1. Signaling and taxes
Bhattacharya (1979) develops a theoretical model of dividend signaling in which
dividends are seen as a costly means of removing information asymmetries in the market
concerning a firm’s true value. Signaling costs are a function of (1) the differential tax treatment
of dividends versus capital gains and (2) the financing costs of raising unexpected funds to fulfill
dividend obligations. In Bhattacharya’s model, taxes are an important factor in determining
dividend announcements’ signaling effects. Dividends are informative due to the higher tax rates
on dividends relative to capital gains. As agents for shareholders, managers are expected to
optimize the after-tax objective function of the shareholders. Bhattacharya (1979) argues that
when there are personal taxes on dividends, the level of the tax is positively related to the
strength of the dividend signal. A higher tax rate should provide managers of firms with a
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stronger incentive to tell the truth about the firm’s expected cash flows. Hence, a taxable
dividend is a good and credible signal, as it is costly for firms with poor performance to imitate.
Additional theoretical developments are provided by John and Williams (1985). Their
model is similar to Bhattacharya’s with respect to the cost of signaling, as both models point to a
tax penalty on dividends relative to capital gains as the primary cost of signaling. In both models,
dividends are informative because of the higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains.
The absence of taxes on dividends and capital gains in Oman provides us with a golden
opportunity to examine the predictions of Bhattacharya (1979) and John and Williams (1985).
Under this scenario, tax-based signaling models predict that dividends are not informative or are,
at least, less informative. If we find that the stock price reacts to cash dividend announcements,
then this would suggest that higher taxation on dividends relative to capital gains is not a
necessary condition for dividends to be informative.
2.2. Signaling and agency costs
Due to the separation between ownership and control, managers (agents) may not always
act in the best interests of the firm owners. This problem induces shareholders to incur agency
costs to monitor managers’ behavior. Dividend payments may help in aligning the interests of
managers and shareholders by cutting down the cash available for use at the discretion of
management and, hence, providing protection against self-interested actions by the management
(Easterbrook, 1984). Moreover, paying larger dividends reduces discretionary internal cash flow
and forces the firm to seek external financing from capital markets, which places it under the
scrutiny and disciplining effects of investment professionals (Easterbrook, 1984). In other words,
capital markets provide an efficient monitoring mechanism that helps firms to reduce both excess
perquisite consumption and the agency problem.
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Jensen (1986) suggests that managers, motivated by compensation and human capital
considerations, have incentives to overinvest free cash flows even in the absence of profitable
growth opportunities (the free cash flow hypothesis). In this case, dividend payout policy
becomes a vehicle for monitoring managers’ potential to misuse excess funds. Hence, the
observed market reaction following dividend changes is consistent with a reduction in agency
costs.
A clear implication of the standard free cash flow hypothesis as advanced by Jensen
(1986) is the separation of ownership and control, since wider ownership dispersion intensifies
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Such conflicts of interest generally
motivate higher dividend payouts to limit managers’ ability to misuse shareholder funds. In
Oman, for the most part, firms are closely held, with ownership concentrated in the hands of
family members in the form of large equity blocks.4 This phenomenon suggests that in Oman,
firms have a disincentive to misuse funds through overinvesting because the relative benefit of
managing a larger firm is likely to be outweighed by the direct cost to managers of overinvesting
in their substantial personal holdings in the firm. Furthermore, firms in Oman are highly levered,
and when banks play a pivotal role in financing firms, agency problems should be less severe (Al
Yahyaee, 2006). Jensen (1986) argues that debt could serve as a substitute for dividends in

4

For recent survey papers that investigate ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, see:

Claessens et al. (2002), which shows that firm value increases with the ownership of the largest shareholder;
Holderness (2003), who shows that block holders closely monitor the form and level of managerial compensation;
and Denis and McConnell (2003), who show that ownership tends to be more concentrated in nations where there is
a relatively lower level of investor protection. The Claessens et al. (2002) paper surveys evidence from eight East
Asian economies, Holderness (2003) includes all nations, while Denis and McConnell (2003) examine all nations
except the U.S.
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reducing the agency problem. Oman’s high leverage, together with its patterns of concentrated
ownership, leads the existing tax-based signaling literature to expect a weaker information
content for dividend announcements.
2.3. Dividend as signal
There are numerous studies that examine stock price reactions to dividend
announcements. These studies generally report that stock prices follow the same direction as the
dividend change announcements. Dividend increases and dividend initiations (or, alternatively,
decreases and omissions) are associated with significant increases (or decreases) in stock prices.
An early, extensive empirical study that tests the information content of dividend
announcements is Watts (1973). His analysis suggests that dividends convey little, if any,
information about stock valuations once current earnings are controlled for in the experiment. In
contrast, Pettit (1972) demonstrates that stock prices react significantly to dividend
announcements. Charest (1978) examines a larger number of firms announcing dividends over a
long period and finds that abnormal returns are observed beyond the next quarter.
The two most frequently cited studies in this area are Aharony and Swary (1980) and
Asquith and Mullins (1983). Both papers use a naïve dividend forecasting model. Aharony and
Swary (1980) investigate the effects of dividend announcements made on dates different from
the earnings announcements. Similar to Pettit (1972), they document that cash dividend
announcements provide information beyond what is included in corresponding quarterly earnings
announcements. Asquith and Mullins (1983) show significant positive abnormal returns at
dividend

initiation

announcements.

Significant

abnormal

returns

around

dividend

announcements are also reported by Bajaj and Vijh (1995).

9

Using data from China, Chen et al. (2002) examine the information content of dividends
among firms that change their dividends frequently. They find that cash dividends have no
discernible association with stock returns in these cases. Their analysis suggests that the
variability of dividends diminishes their information content. The fact that dividends vary
frequently in Oman may also weaken their role as a signals.
There are also studies that examine the information signaling hypothesis of seasoned
equity offerings (SEOs) and stock splits. In this vein, Elliott et al. (2008) examine the
information content of SEOs and find no support for the information signaling hypothesis. Chern
et al. (2008) study the information content of stock splits and find that prices of optional stocks
embody more information, diminishing the information content of stock split announcements.
Likewise, Hwang et al. (2008) examine dividend signaling in stock splits. They find that the
information contained in stock splits is not rapidly impounded in stock prices.
3. Data
Our sample consists of the universe of Omani companies announcing cash dividends
between January 1, 1997 and August 31, 2005. Announcement dates of cash dividends, stock
dividends, splits, and earnings are obtained from the Muscat Depository and Registration
Company Database and the MSM website. We also extract earnings data from the “ShareHolding Guide of MSM Listed Companies.” Stock price data and the MSM index are obtained
from the MSM database.
We exclude observations that accompany other corporate events, such as stock dividends,
splits, or subscription rights. Moreover, we eliminate observations if rights or stock dividend
announcements were made during the event study period. After this screening process, the final
sample consists of 501 cash dividend announcements. As shown in Table 1, approximately 50
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percent of firms increased cash dividends (n = 251), 36 percent decreased dividends (n = 178),
and 14 percent had no change in dividends (n = 72).
Insert Table 1
We examine the trends in dividend payout policy by utilizing aggregate data by calendar
year on total cash dividends, aggregate earnings, and total market value of equity. Table 2 shows
that firms distribute a large proportion of their earnings as dividends. On average, Omani firms
distribute around 77% of their earnings as dividends. The figures presented in Table 2 also show
that Omani firms distributed around 3.57% of their market value as dividends in 1997. This ratio
increased to 17.24% in 2003 and then declined to 5.02% in 2005.
Insert Table 2
We also obtain data on the announced dividend per share in rials, DIVit, and the stock
price ten days before the announcement day, Pit. We use these data to calculate dividend yield
DIVit/Pit, the change in dividend, ∆DIVit = (DIVit – DIVi,t-1), and the change in earnings per
share, ∆EPSit = (EPSit – EPSi,t-1), for both dividend increases and decreases.5 The figures
presented in Table 3 show that the average dividend yield for the dividend increase sample is
8.20%. The change in dividends is around 8.39% and the change in earnings per share is 8.47%
for the same sample. For the dividend decrease sample, the average dividend yield is 6.15%, the
change in dividends is -4.75%, and the change in earnings per share is -5.68%.
Insert Table 3

5

This is similar to the approach in Amihud and Murgia (1997).
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4. Methodology
The methodology used in this study follows standard event study methodology (e.g.,
Binder, 1998). Using the market model, we calculate the following statistics: daily abnormal
return, daily average abnormal return, and cumulative average abnormal return.6
In addition, as a robustness check and to test the sensitivity of our results to beta
estimation, we follow Charest (1978) and calculate market adjusted abnormal return by
subtracting the MSM daily return from the observed stock’s return over a given period t.
The t-statistic used in this paper is detailed in Boehmer et al. (1991). This test is used in
many studies, including Graham et al. (2003), Kadapakkam and Martinez (2008), and Adams
and Mansi (2009).

5. Empirical results
In this study, we test the null hypothesis that the daily mean abnormal return is zero. In
other words, cash dividend announcements have no systematic impact on corresponding stock
prices. We test this hypothesis by performing a parametric t-test, where t-statistics are calculated
using the cross-sectional standard deviation.7

6

We estimate the parameters for the market models from a regression of daily stock returns on daily market returns

from 250 to 41 days before the announcement date (t = -250 to t = -41, where t = 0 is the announcement date).
7

To check the robustness of the conclusions based on our parametric tests, we also employ a nonparametric sign

test. Our results are insensitive to this new method. In particular, the z-statistic on the announcement day is 7.5745
for dividend increase and -8.6410 for dividend decrease. For no change sample, the z-statistic is -1.4142 which is
insignificant at any conventional level of significance.
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5.1. Dividend increase
Table 4 provides daily mean abnormal returns and t-statistics (testing that the mean
abnormal returns are equal to zero) for the five days before and after the dividend announcement
date (Day 0), using both the market model and the market adjusted return.
Insert Table 4
The positive dividend declaration dates are preceded by positive returns for the five days
before the announcement. Interestingly, the abnormal return earned on day -1 by dividend
increasing companies is 1.3%, with a t-statistic of 3.97. The presence of significant positive
abnormal returns on day -1 shows a somewhat earlier market reaction to the cash dividend
announcement, which may suggest that there is some information leakage into the market. A
further 5.78% abnormal return occurs on the announcement date. The results show that the
market’s major reaction takes place on day 0. This average abnormal return is the largest of the
abnormal returns in the event period studied. These mean abnormal returns are highly
significant, especially on the announcement date. The results are consistent with an information
effect in dividend increase announcements, and thus, they imply that relevant information is
transmitted to the market when increases in dividends are announced. These results are in line
with those found in the U.S. and strongly contradict the tax-signaling model, which argues that a
higher tax on dividends is a necessary condition for dividends to be informative.
Similar results emerge using market adjusted returns. There is a significant positive
market reaction to dividend increases. The average abnormal return on the announcement date is
5.88%, which is very close to the one reported using the market model. These results suggest that
the estimation error and/or instability of the betas are unlikely to be a driver of our results.
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5.2. Dividend decrease
Table 5 gives the results for the dividend decrease sample. These results show that
abnormal returns are significantly negative when a dividend decrease is announced. The largest
t-statistic occurs on the day of the dividend announcement.
Insert Table 5
The results again support the hypothesis that dividend decreases impart negative
information about the firm’s prospects. However, the mean abnormal returns for dividend
decrease announcements are of much smaller magnitude than those of the corresponding
dividend increase announcements.8 These results are at odds with many previous findings, which
show that dividend decreases generate price responses that are larger in absolute magnitude than
those of dividend increases (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; among
others). For instance, the daily stock price results of these studies report that mean abnormal
negative returns on announcement day range from -3% to -10% for unfavorable dividend
announcements, while mean abnormal returns for favorable news are around 1%. Just as with
dividend increases, the results obtained here are at odds with tax-signaling models, which argue
that taxes are a necessary condition for dividends to have information. The results using marketadjusted returns are almost identical to those reported using the market model.
5.3. No change
Table 6 reports the results for companies that did not change their dividends. If no news
is being signaled to the stock market, then one might logically assume that no abnormal stock
price movements would be expected. Our results are in line with this proposition.

8

It is worth noting that the size effects for dividend decreases are smaller than those for dividend increases. See

Table 3.
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Insert Table 6
The results show that investors who hold these companies’ stocks earned only normal
returns over the five days preceding and following the cash dividend announcement dates. Mean
abnormal returns drift randomly over the event period with no significant changes on day 0.
Mean daily abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. However, the negative
signs on the dividend announcement dates are in contrast with those reported in the U.S. For
example, the mean abnormal returns to announcements of no change in dividends in the U.S.
were significantly positive in Bajaj and Vijh (1990).
In brief, our results reveal that cash dividend announcements do carry new information to
the market. The market reacts favorably to “good news” announcements (dividend increases) and
adversely to “bad news” announcements (dividend decreases), which supports the view that
dividend changes convey information in Oman. These results sharply contrast with tax-based
signaling models, which argue that higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains are a
necessary condition for dividends to be informative.
5.4. Cumulative abnormal returns
We also calculate cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for different intervals.
The null hypothesis to be tested is that the cumulative average abnormal returns will be equal to
zero. The test statistic is the ratio of the cumulative average abnormal return to its estimated
standard error. The results are presented in Table 7.
The two day window (-1, 0) shows a significant positive wealth effect surrounding a cash
dividend increase. When the event window is widened to include additional trading days (-2, +2)
before and after the announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns are also positive and
statistically significant. For the (-4, +4) and (-5, +5) windows, the cumulative abnormal returns
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are positive but insignificant. The CARs for the pre-announcement window (-5, -1) are positive
but insignificant. For the post-announcement window (+1, +5), the cumulative abnormal returns
are negative and insignificant. The results are very similar whether we use the market model or
market adjusted returns.
For dividend decreases, the (-1, 0) window reveals a significant negative reaction to the
“bad news” announcements. The CARs are insignificant in the other event windows. These
conclusions using CARs from the market adjusted return model are consistent with those from
the market model.
Insert Table 7
When there is no change in dividends, the results reveal that the cumulative abnormal
returns are insignificant in all event windows examined, under both the market model and market
adjusted returns model. This finding suggests that announcements of no change in dividends do
not result in significant changes in stock price.
5.5. Regression results on changes in dividends and earnings
To examine whether dividends contain information beyond that contained in earnings, we
follow the approach in Amihud and Murgia (1997). Specifically, we estimate a model where
announcement abnormal returns are a function of both dividend changes and earnings changes
relative to stock price. The results are presented in Table 8.
Our results show that both the ∆DIV/P and ∆EPS/P are statistically significant, which
suggests that both dividends and earnings news contain information. This discovery, in turn,
suggests that dividends and earnings are strongly associated with abnormal returns. The adjusted
R2 of the model is 10.78%, and the F-statistic is significant at the one percent level. There are no
important differences between the response coefficients of dividend increases and decreases. As
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in Amihud and Murgia (1997), changes in dividends result in significant positive stock price
reactions beyond what might be expected for the information conveyed just by changes in
earnings. It should also be noted that the dependent variable in this regression is the abnormal
return on the dividend announcement date. We do not measure the earnings announcement
return.
Insert Table 8
We also estimate the stock price reaction to changes in dividends and changes in earnings
(Table 9). We find similar results to those reported above. This finding suggests that dividends
contain information beyond that contained in earnings.
Insert Table 9
6. Conclusion
While there are many studies that examine dividend signaling in the U.S., this paper is
one of the few investigations of this topic in emerging markets; it is the first of its kind using
Omani data. In addition, the data set employed in this paper is unique in that (1) there are no
taxes on dividends and capital gains in Oman, which allows us to test a tax-based signaling
model argument that higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains are a necessary condition
for dividends to be informative, (2) the high concentration of share ownership should reduce
information asymmetry between managers and investors, which suggests a diminished role for
dividends, (3) there is low corporate transparency, which implies a positive effect for dividends,
and (4) most companies change their dividends almost every year.
Our results indicate that cash dividend announcements do convey information to the
market. That is, firms announcing an increase in their dividends experience a significant positive
price reaction, and firms announcing dividend decreases experience a significant decline in stock
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prices. Firms that have no change in their dividends report insignificantly negative average
abnormal returns.
Our findings support the notion that dividend increases convey positive information,
which results in a positive price reaction; dividend decreases similarly result in negative price
reactions. This study confirms earlier studies’ findings that there is a significant abnormal return
during the announcement period. Our analysis is consistent with theories stating that the
announcement effect is due to dividend announcements’ signaling of valuable information.
These results are in contrast with tax-based signaling models, which propose that higher taxes on
dividends relative to capital gains are a necessary condition for dividend announcements to be
informative. In a market like Oman, with highly concentrated shareholdings and limited
disclosure of information, dividends may be the one source of information that allows investors
to evaluate management’s expectations and confidence as to the future performance of a firm.
Although Oman’s stock market is young and investors there have limited knowledge and
experience, the stock market appears to efficiently incorporate dividends information in share
prices and returns. Further development of accounting standards, increased auditing skills, and
advances in investor education will likely make dividends even more important in the future.
Though it is beyond the scope of the current paper, it is possible that the reactions to cash
dividend announcements observed in this paper might be due to behavioral characteristics of
irrational investors (see, for example, Malkiel (2003) and Shiller (2003)). Future research to
address this issue seems warranted.
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Table 1
Frequency of firm-year observations
Year
Dividend Decrease No Change
1997
17
7
1998
12
3
1999
21
8
2000
14
13
2001
26
2
2002
31
9
2003
31
8
2004
21
16
2005
5
6
Total
178
72

Dividend Increase
21
31
27
26
24
17
31
34
40
251

Total
45
46
56
53
52
57
70
71
51
501

The table reports the number of firm-year observations for each year of the sample for dividend decrease, no change,
and dividend increase.

Table 2
Cash dividend distributions
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

∑i DIV
60.511
38.027
50.702
59.249
45.382
81.488
210.298
237.674
98.501

∑i EARN
137.294
76.020
75.648
137.365
54.218
124.951
140.304
169.240
198.490

∑i MV
1,692.623
824.484
835.341
747.740
610.507
937.844
1,220.041
1,728.093
1,961.265

∑i DIV/∑i EARN
(%)
44.07
50.02
67.02
43.13
83.70
65.22
149.89
140.44
49.63

∑i DIV/∑i MV
(%)
3.57
4.61
6.07
7.92
7.43
8.69
17.24
13.75
5.02

The table presents the annual information on cash dividend distributions to stockholders for a sample of Omani
firms. The sample consists of all firm-year observations that have data in the Share-Holding Guide of MSM Listed
Companies over the period 1997 to 2005 that have available information on the following variables: DIV, EARN
and MV. DIV is the total amount of dividends declared on the common stock. EARN is the earnings after taxes. MV
is the market value of common stock. The sample contains 512 firm-year observations. ∑i represents the aggregation
of data by calendar year. The aggregate numbers are expressed in million of Rials.

Table 3
Descriptive statistics
Category
Dividends Increase
Dividends Decrease

DIV/P (%)
8.2033
6.1505

∆DIV (%)
8.3896
-4.7525

∆EPS (%)
8.4714
-5.6784

Observations
234
145

The table reports DIV/P, ∆DIV, and ∆EPS for dividend increases and decreases. DIV/P is the dividend yield, where
DIV is the announced dividend per share and P is the stock price ten days before the announcement day. ∆DIV is
change in dividend per share from the previous year. ∆EPS is change in earnings per share from previous year.
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Table 4
The stock market reaction to dividend increase in the Muscat Securities Market
Event
AR(Market Model)
T-statistics AR(Market Adjusted Return)
-5
0.5306
0.2863
0.5699
-4
0.4765
0.2233
0.4331
-3
0.1355
0.7301
0.0824
-2
0.2935
0.2109
0.2515
-1
1.3026
3.9654
1.3774
0
5.7826
6.0339
5.8807
1
0.3720
1.1594
0.4323
2
0.1447
0.5275
0.1155
3
0.0970
0.4039
-0.0363
4
-0.6311
-0.7421
-0.6149
5
-0.2750
-1.5972
-0.3780

T-statistics
0.2541
0.1629
0.4230
0.1699
3.9865
6.1021
1.3323
0.4065
-0.1489
-0.7247
-1.2118

The sample consists of 251 cash dividend increase announcements in the period January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2005
for firms listed at the Muscat Securities Market. The Abnormal Return is defined as (1) the difference between the
actual return on day i and the expected return predicted from the market model and (2) the market adjusted return. Tstatistics are for the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero.

Table 5
The stock market reaction to dividend decrease in the Muscat Securities Market
Event
AR(Market Model)
T-statistics AR(Market Adjusted Return)
-5
0.0863
0.0886
0.1669
-4
0.5818
0.5841
0.5015
-3
0.8056
0.7919
0.6266
-2
0.1858
0.1898
0.9992
-1
-1.0206
-1.0683
-0.8038
0
-2.4904
-4.1037
-2.4161
1
-0.3666
-0.3368
-0.5830
2
0.9777
1.0376
0.9077
3
0.6026
0.6440
0.4017
4
-0.2302
-0.1889
-0.1317
5
0.5173
0.5018
0.1869

T-statistics
0.1698
0.5010
0.6108
1.0156
-0.8365
-4.0225
-0.5343
0.9564
0.2872
-0.1072
0.1813

The sample consists of 178 cash dividend decrease announcements in the period January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2005
for firms listed at the Muscat Securities Market. The Abnormal Return is defined as (1) the difference between the
actual return on day i and the expected return predicted from the market model and (2) the market adjusted return. Tstatistics are for the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero.
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Table 6
The stock market reaction to no change in dividends in the Muscat Securities Market
Event
AR(Market Model)
T-statistics
AR(Market Adjusted Return) T-statistics
-5
0.2458
0.6709
0.3567
0.9154
-4
0.8876
0.2943
0.9310
0.2772
-3
0.2756
0.7683
0.3952
0.8315
-2
0.2155
1.2451
-0.0696
-0.1928
-1
0.0202
0.1087
0.0542
0.2392
0
-0.9432
-1.4502
-0.7776
-1.1845
1
-0.8499
-1.6158
-0.2105
-0.3920
2
-0.4746
-1.1826
-0.5840
-1.3880
3
-0.3810
-1.1323
-0.4165
-1.1953
4
-0.7067
-0.5126
-0.6455
-0.4623
5
0.3728
1.3931
0.3471
1.1180
The sample consists of 72 no change cash dividend announcements in the period January 1, 1997 to August 31, 2005
for firms listed at the Muscat Securities Market. The Abnormal Return is defined as (1) the difference between the
actual return on day i and the expected return predicted from the market model and (2) the market adjusted return. Tstatistics are for the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return is equal to zero.

Table 7
Cumulative abnormal returns for dividend increase, dividend decrease, and no change in
dividends.
Dividend Increase
Dividend Decrease
No Change
Market
Market
Market
Adjusted
Market
Adjusted
Market
Market Adjusted
Model
Return
Model
Return
Model
Return
(+5,-5)
0.0823
0.0811
-0.0035
-0.0014
-0.0134
-0.0061
(0.9450)
(0.8292)
(-0.0326)
(-0.0128)
(-0.1747)
(-0.0722)
(-4,+4)
0.0797
0.0792
-0.0095
-0.0050
-0.0196
-0.0131
(1.1931)
(1.0787)
(-0.1092)
(-0.0539)
(-0.2785)
(-0.1694)
(-3,+3)
0.0813
0.0810
-0.0131
-0.0087
-0.0214
-0.0160
(2.1973)
(2.1120)
(-0.2002)
(-0.1238)
(-0.8123)
(-0.5328)
(-2,+2)
0.0790
0.0806
-0.0271
-0.0190
-0.0203
-0.0158
(2.4121)
(2.3709)
(-0.5936)
(-0.4134)
(-1.0495)
(-0.7244)
(-1,+1)
0.0746
0.0769
-0.0388
-0.0380
-0.0177
-0.0092
(4.6385)
(4.7073)
(-1.4629)
(-1.4336)
(-1.3019)
(-0.6620)
(-1,0)
0.0709
0.0726
-0.0351
-0.0322
-0.0092
-0.0072
(5.5059)
(5.5438)
(-2.2475)
(-2.0619)
(-1.1043)
(-0.8192)
(-5,-1)
0.0274
0.0271
0.0064
0.0149
0.0164
0.0167
(0.4648)
(0.3921)
(0.1298)
(0.3008)
(0.4012)
(0.3466)
(+1,+5)
-0.0029
-0.0048
0.0150
0.0078
-0.0204
-0.0150
(-0.1574)
(-0.2535)
(0.2877)
(0.1372)
(-0.7009)
(-0.5018)
The table presents the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for dividend increase, dividend decrease, and no
change using the market model and the market adjusted return. T-statistics are for the null hypothesis that the
cumulative average abnormal returns are equal to zero. T-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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Table 8
Regression results of abnormal returns on dividend changes and earnings changes relative to
stock price
Variable
Coefficient
T-statistic
Constant
0.1685***
3.9278
∆DIV/P
4.2789***
5.0909
∆EPS/P
0.5793***
3.1918
2
Adjusted R
0.1078
F-value
26.2028
Observations
418
The table reports the results of estimating the announcement abnormal returns (based on the market model) on both
the changes in dividends and changes in earnings relative to the stock price ten days before the announcement day.
The table shows the variable, their coefficients, and their t-statistics. T-statistics are heteroscedastic consistent
(White, 1980).
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 9
Regression results of abnormal returns on dividend changes and earnings changes
Variable
Coefficient
T-statistic
Constant
0.1640***
3.7421
∆DIV
2.4916***
5.4156
∆EPS
0.1846**
2.5484
2
Adjusted R
0.0940
F-value
22.6311
Observations
418
The table reports the results of estimating the announcement abnormal returns (based on the market model) on both
the changes in dividends and earnings. The table shows the variable, their coefficients, and their t-statistics. Tstatistics are heteroscedastic consistent (White, 1980).
*, **, and *** represent significance at the 10, 5, 1 percent levels, respectively.
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